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Abstract
This paper studies a traditional monopolistic market of information goods in the pres-
ence of an inherently strong peer-to-peer le-sharing network. Specically, such a strong
network is made possible by a few fanatic users who selessly contribute to the sharing
of les. We nd that the most prevalent equilibrium outcome is the one where the rm
accommodates the network and competes in price. We establish that coordination failure
in the forming of networks is not an issue once we consider a high level of taste heterogene-
ity and include such fanatic users in the model. We also nd possible network-deterring
market structures, although these can only happen under limited circumstances. Further-
more, it is not impossible to see the rm and the network co-existing as local monopolies
not serving the entire market and therefore not competing. For this market structure to
occur, the taste heterogeneity has to be very large. Finally, we nd that in all the equi-
librium structures, total welfare always decreases in taste heterogeneity and the generic
cost factor of downloading.
JEL classication: L11; L82; L86.
Keywords: information products; the music industry; piracy; P2P (peer-to-peer) le-
sharing networks; network externalities; pricing; multi-platform competition.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a traditional monopolistic market of information goods in the presence of
an inherently strong peer-to-peer le-sharing network. In most of today's P2P le-sharing
networks, there are always a few fanatic users who selessly contribute to the sharing of les
by uploading their own les (e.g. music, movies, software, etc.) for other's to download. The
model is taken from Herings, Peeters and Yang (2008), but here we look at a dierent set of
parameter values in order to reect this inherent strength of the P2P networks.
There are two lines of literature which are related to the online piracy fostered by P2P
le-sharing networks. One is the literature on piracy itself, including papers like Novos and
Waldman (1984), Liebowitz (1985), Johnson (1985), where the authors study how a rm
can react to piracy. The rm generally has three possibilities, do not react at all if piracy
poses no real threat, use piracy-deterring pricing, or use piracy-accommodating pricing. The
other line of classical literature concerns network externalities, where representative papers
include e.g. Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986). Conner and
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Rumelt (1991) and Takeyama (1994) combine the two subjects and nd that unauthorized
reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of consumptive externalities can induce
greater rm prots and lead to Pareto improvements.
Recent literature has also studied the phenomenon of P2P in particular. Gayer and Shy
(2003) studies how publishers of digitally-stored products can utilize P2P networks to enhance
sales of their products sold in the stores. This result follows from the positive consumption
externalities in their model. Another way in which rms can benet from P2P activity is
in set-ups with imperfect information about product characteristics. The eects of sampling
possibilities due to P2P networks are studied by Peitz and Waelbroek (2006b). The authors
show that under sucient taste heterogeneity and product diversity, the positive eect of
downloading on sales due to sampling may compensate the negative eect.
The most relevant existing paper is our previous work Herings et al. (2008), where we
developed a two-stage game theoretic model that is also adopted in this paper. The focus
there is a monopoly facing a P2P network with positive but nonlinear externalities. The paper
models the interaction of the rm and the P2P le-sharing network as a two-stage game. In
the rst stage, the rm sets a price for the physical form of the product. Then, in the
second stage, after having observed the price set by the rm, consumers simultaneously and
independently decide whether to legally buy the physical form of the product or to download
the digital form via the P2P network, or not to acquire the content at all. The consumers are
heterogenous with respect to their tastes regarding the physical form and the digital form of
the product, and we use the standard Hotelling model to describe their preferences. In their
decisions, consumers have to anticipate each others' decisions, since the resulting network size
determines the actual costs of downloading. In such circumstances, consumers may fail to
coordinate on a Pareto-optimal network size, thereby giving the rm a lot of room to price
the network out of the market.
We adopt the same model in this paper, but with one crucial dierence on the parameter
assumptions. In Herings et al. (2008), there is an assumption on two parameters that leads to
the situation where no consumer will join a network if the size of such a network is expected
to be 0. We reverse the relation between these two parameters so that now the consumer who
prefers the digital version the most will join a P2P network even if the network is expected
to be empty. This is to reect the realistic situation where there are always some \die-hard"
P2P network fanatics who selessly provide the availability of such networks.
Furthermore, we relax the assumption on the relatively small parameter value of con-
sumers' taste heterogeneity. More specically, we now allow consumers' taste heterogeneity
to be so high that consumers with extreme preferences may not consume the least preferred
version of the product even if it is costless. In so doing, we are able to capture more scenarios,
including those where the market is partially served by the rm and the network together. We
discover that coordination failure in the forming of networks is not an issue once we consider
a high level of taste heterogeneity and include such fanatic users in the model.
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In total, we nd ve possible equilibrium market structures in this paper. Out of the ve
market structures, the most prevalent is the one where the rm accommodates the network
and competes in price. In this case, the rm's prot suers and the total welfare benets from
the existence of P2P. In the settings of this paper, the rm can still deter the network, but
under very limited circumstances when taste heterogeneity is low, the quality of the physical
form is high, and the legal enforcement is relatively strict. Think of the newspaper market
as an example of this. The rm can also nd itself in the position to want to optimally serve
the whole market, if the value of its product is signicantly higher than that of the pirated
version, and the taste heterogeneity is low. Another special market structure is that of a
market-sharing case, which happens when taste heterogeneity is just so that the rm chooses
to precisely serve the consumers who prefer not to download. Eectively, the rm lets the
network form to its maximum size, and then serves the residual demand. Thus, the rm and
the network together serve the market fully without competing with each other. Furthermore,
there is a possibility where the rm can ignore the network and act as a monopoly, when taste
heterogeneity is huge. Yet the rm's prot actually decreases in taste heterogeneity. So does
the consumers' surplus. Total welfare, therefore, decreases in taste heterogeneity, and in the
cost factor of downloading.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section ?? the two-stage model is
described in detail. Next, the consumers' choices in the second stage, given the price set by
the rm in the rst stage, are presented in Section ??. Subsequently, in Section ??, the rm's
pricing decision in the rst stage, and the resulting market structures, are analyzed. There-
after, Section ?? gives an overview of the equilibrium outcomes analyzed in Section ?? and
provides economic intuitions. Section ?? discusses the comparative statics of the monopoly
equilibrium outcome. Finally, Section ?? and 8 conclude and discuss the results.
2 The model
The model is taken from Herings et al. (2008), where we consider two forms of the same
product. We refer to the legal product sold by the rm (CD or DVD) as the physical form
and the P2P version of it as the digital form.
The game has two stages. In stage one, the rm sets a price p for the physical form of
the product. Next, in stage two, after having observed the price set by the rm, consumers
decide simultaneously and independently whether to purchase the physical form sold by the
rm (S), to download the digital form via the P2P network (N), or not to acquire the product
at all (;). There is a continuum of consumers who dier in their relative preference of the
physical form over the digital form.
The price p set by the rm and the prole of consumers' choices determine the sales by
the rm, s 2 [0; 1], total quantity of consumers buying the physical form, and the size of the
network n 2 [0; 1], total quantity of consumers who choose to download the digital form from
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the network.
We assume, for simplicity, that the rm has zero costs in production and aims to maximize
its prot, given by
 = p  s(p):
The utility of a consumer with identity x 2 [0; 1] is given by
Ux(p) =
8><>:
  x   p if S
   (1  x) C(n(p)) if N
0 if ;,
where  > 0 and  > 0 represent the basic utility of the physical and the digital form
respectively. The identity x 2 [0; 1] reects the consumer's relative preference over the two
forms. The consumer with identity x = 0 has a strong preference for the physical form,
whereas the consumer with identity x = 1 has a strong preference for the digital form.
For consumers x 2 (0; 1), the acquisition of one of the forms generates a disutility that
depends on the identity x and the parameter  > 0. The parameter  captures the amount of
heterogeneity in consumers' tastes. Notice that  and  capture the objective qualities of the
two forms of the products, while  is a factor that inuences the subjective individual utility a
consumer gets from the product. For instance, an illegally downloaded album of MP3 les is
of inferior quality to the original CD that it is \ripped" from, but some might actually prefer
the MP3 version since it's easier to carry around in the iPod.
Finally, C(n) represents the costs of downloading when the resulting network is of size
n 2 [0; 1]. A higher number of users of a network improves the availability of les and hence
decreases the standard search costs and downloading time. Therefore, we implement a cost
function of downloading that is decreasing and convex in the number of users of the P2P
network,1
C(n) =   (1  n)2;
where  > 0 represents the generic cost factor of downloading, incorporating a collection of
factors that may aect downloading costs, for instance, the degree of legal enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Note that  is identical for every consumer and is independent
of the network size.
We impose some assumptions on the consumers' behavior in case of indierence. When
a consumer is indierent between buying from the rm and not acquiring the product or
between the rm and the network, she chooses the rm. When she is indierent between
the network and not acquiring the product, she chooses the network. Thus, without loss of
1The quadratic specication of the cost function for downloading satises the qualitative properties just
stated, while it preserves analytical tractability of the model.
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generality, we assume a linear order of priority of the rm (S) above the network (N), and
the network (N) above not acquiring the product (;).
Next, we impose the following assumptions on the relevant parameters.
Assumption 1.  > .
Personal preferences aside, the objective product quality of the original physical form is higher
than that of the digital form (which is \ripped" from the original).
Assumption 2.  > .
There is at least one consumer (namely, the one located at x = 1), who prefers joining P2P to
not consuming at all even if the network is empty. Or to put it dierently, the consumer who
prefers the digital form the most is always willing to start a network. This implies that there
is always a P2P network, unless the rm charges such a low price that even the consumer
located at x = 1 prefers to buy the physical form, in which case the market is fully served by
the rm. In other words, this consumer is always served.
Note that we do not impose any assumptions on the value of  .
3 Consumers' choice
We start the analysis with determining the possible Nash equilibria for each of the subgames.
Then, we consider the rm's pricing behavior in the rst stage and analyze some interesting
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Firstly, it is important to clarify three terms that we use in describing the equilibrium
solutions of the network size n 2 [0; 1]: no network, critical-mass network and maximum
network. Consider the case where the price set by the rm in stage one is high enough to be
consistent with the formation of a P2P network. Due to the positive network externalities
and the law of demand, there are typically two equilibrium network sizes. The smaller one
is called the critical-mass network and denoted by c:m:. If all the consumers expect that the
network size to be like this, such expectations will be self-enforcing. There is one consumer
who is indierent between buying from the rm and downloading via the P2P network and
whose choice follows the priority order assumption. All consumers with higher utility from
downloading are strictly better o joining the network and all the other consumers are strictly
better o at the rm.
Since we have positive downloading externalities, the critical-mass network is destabilized
when slightly more consumers, located closest to the indierent consumer, join it. If all
consumers expect that the network is like this, the consumer with the highest value of x
buying at the rm will strictly prefer to download, so these expectations are not compatible
with a second-stage equilibrium. When this consumer changes to the network, the same
process happens to the consumer next to him who now may also strictly prefer to download.
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This process continues until the network size stabilizes at a larger size, called the maximum
network, denoted by m:n: that can be supported as a second-stage equilibrium, where the
maximal network may be the one with all consumers in it.
The opposite reasoning applies when the critical-mass network is destabilized because
slightly less consumers located closest to the indierent consumer joins the network. Now less
and less consumers will want to join the network until the network reaches the size of 0.
Therefore, there are in total three equilibrium network sizes. The maximum network and
the zero network are stable, and the critical-mass network is instable. This gives rise to the
concept of coordination failure in network forming. Within our terminology, a network may
experience coordination failure only when both the maximum and the critical-mass network
exist, given the relevant price. In other words, if for a given price, the critical-mass network
does not exist, coordination failure can not occur. In the majority part of the analysis in this
paper, the maximum network is the only equilibrium network size. A formal computation
of the solutions of the critical-mass and maximum network in the fully- and partially-served
markets can be found in the Appendices.
Second-stage equilibrium market structures can dier in two dimensions: the degree to
which consumers are served and the platforms that are actively used. Regarding the rst
dimension, the market can be fully served or partially served as is displayed in Figure 1 for a
multi-platformed market.2 Regarding the second dimension we can have a multi-platformed
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Figure 1: Fully-served market and partially-served market.
market or a single-platformed market with either only the rm or only the P2P network.
Note that the market can not be partially served by the store alone due to Assumption 2, i.e.
[S=;] does not exist. For the second stage, we can therefore restrict our attention to the ve
market structures depicted in Table 1. Observe that, the situation in the graph on the left of
Figure 1 is denoted by [S=N ]; and the one on the right by [S=;=N ].
Which one of these ve possible market structures prevails in the second stage depends,
apart from the price p set in the rst stage, on the parameter values. The set of parameter
values determines the group of possible second-stage equilibrium market structures.
Recalling Assumption 2, we have  > , but no restrictions on their relations with  . Not
putting any assumptions on  results in three possible scenarios: high heterogeneity scenario
2Notice that the vertical intercept of the utility level from the network is endogenously determined by the
resulting network size. The quantities z, zS and zN are used for the analysis in the appendices.
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single-platformed
rm network multi-platformed
fully-served [S] [N ] [S=N ]
partially-served [;=N ] [S=;=N ]
Table 1: All possible market structures in stage two.
( >  > ), medium heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ), and low heterogeneity scenario
( >  > ).3 These three dierent scenarios in turn yield very dierent equilibrium market
outcomes in the second stage given the price set by the rm in the rst stage. Depending
on the level of taste heterogeneity, the market can be fully or partially served, by single or
multiple platforms. In the following analysis we will examine the scenarios separately .
Proposition 1. Given the price p set in the rst stage by the rm, all second-stage equilibrium
market structures in the high heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ) are as depicted in Figure
2.
[S]
[S=N ]m:n:
[S=;=N ]m:n:
[;=N ]m:n:
-
0 p

    +    
 
   
2
(  
p
2   4(   ))



Figure 2: High heterogeneity scenario
The horizontal axis depicts the rst-stage price that the rm charges, and the corresponding
market structures are shown on the vertical axis.4
As the rm raises its price, it gradually loses its market share. When it charges a price
lower than     +     , it fully serves the market alone and deters the formation of the
network. Note that if     +     < 0, the market structure [S] will disappear and [S=N ]
will start at the price of 0 instead. But since this condition does not aect the equilibrium
outcome, we shall not go through the trouble to treat it with separate scenarios. At a price
between  +   and   2 (  
p
2   4(   )), the rm accommodates the network
and together they serve the market fully. At a price between    2 (  
p
2   4(   ))
and , it ignores the network and acts as a monopoly to serve its own monopolistic market
share. In this case the market is partially served. Again, if   2 (  
p
2   4(   )) < 0,
3We ignore the specic analysis of boundary cases where  =  or  = , since they produce degenerate
results without additional insights.
4The proofs of this and the two subsequent propositions can be found in the Appendices.
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both [S] and [S=N ] will disappear from the graph, and [S=;=N ] will start at the price of 0.
And nally at a price higher than , it can not manage to make any sales.
Notice that there is a unique second-stage equilibrium market structure for each rst-
stage price p. Specically, in the price range where the network might form, it is only the
maximum network and not the critical-mass network that exists. This is due to the fact that
 > . The implication is that coordination failure never occurs. In the partially-served
market [S=;=N ], this is caused by the parameter setting of Assumption 2,  > . Since the
rm is not directly involved at the digital end of the market (where x is close to 1), the fact
that there are fanatic P2P users joining even if no one else joins helps eliminate the possibility
of a potential coordination failure. On the other hand, in the fully-served market [S=N ], the
lack of coordination failure is caused by the parameter setting within this scenario,  > .
When the degree of taste heterogeneity is high relative to the cost factor of downloading
and the market is still fully served, it must be that the network is inherently so strong that
the required size of a critical-mass network is extremely low (indeed negative) and therefore
always fullled.
The existence of the partially-served, multi-platformed market structure [S=;=N ] is also
caused by the parameter setting  > . the consumers are suciently dierentiated such that
a section of the market in the middle can be left unserved in equilibrium. Furthermore, the
fact that  >  leads to the direct result that the digital end of the market is always served,
leaving the market structure [S=;] an impossibility.5
In order to determine which price the rm will actually choose in stage one, one needs to
investigate the prot levels of these dierent market structures in stage one. This will be dealt
with in the next section, and we continue this section with analyzing the possible equilibrium
market structures that can result from the rm's pricing in the other two scenarios.
Proposition 2. Given the price p set in the rst stage by the rm, all second-stage equilibrium
market structures in the medium heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ) are as depicted in
Figure 3.
[S]
[S=N ]m:n:
[N ]m:n:
-
0 p

    +    
 

    +  
Figure 3: Medium heterogeneity scenario
Similarly to Proposition 1, there is a unique second-stage equilibrium market structure for
each rst-stage price p. Notice again in particular the lack of critical-mass network and
5These results compare nicely with those from Herings et al. (2008).
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coordination failure in network forming. This proposition also bares some other similarities
with Proposition 1.
The rm is still able to serve the whole market here if it charges a price p   +   .
Again, if   +    < 0, market structure [S=N ] will start at the price of 0. The resulting
market structure is then single-platformed fully-served market [S]. With a price any higher
than that, a network will form and for prices p   + the resulting market structure will
be [S=N ]. Notice that, unlike in the high heterogeneity scenario (Proposition 1), the market
structure [S=;=N ] does not exist in this scenario. This is the case because the consumers are
not suciently dierentiated for the rm to act like a local monopoly and partially serve the
market. In other words, the rm is not able to ignore the network and act as a monopoly due
to the lower level of taste heterogeneity  in this scenario.
For all prices p >     +  the rm fails to make any sales and the market will be fully
served by the network, hence the market structure [N ]. Notice that this price is lower than ,
which is the lower-bound price of the zero-sales market structure [;=N ] in Proposition 1. This
reects the fact that, comparing to the high heterogeneity scenario, the rm is now facing
less dierentiated consumers and hence more direct competition from the network. It now
has less freedom in price setting since it will lose all its consumers at an even lower price,
comparing to the high heterogeneity scenario.
Proposition 3. Given the price p set in the rst stage by the rm, all second-stage equilibrium
market structures in the low heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ) are as depicted in Figure
4.
[S]
[S=N ]c:m:
[S=N ]m:n:
[N ]
-
0 p

    +    2=

    +    

    + 


Figure 4: Low heterogeneity scenario.
The rst striking dierence in this proposition is that there are multiple equilibria. Secondly,
unlike in the two previous propositions, we nd a critical-mass network equilibrium (see
Appendices for the proof). This implies that it is now possible to have a coordination failure
in network forming, specically within the price range [ +    2=;  +   ]. When
the rm charges a price in this range, it is possible that the consumers are able to form a
network if everyone expects this to be the case, or fail to do so if everyone believes a network
will not form.
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The upper-bound price of [S=N ]m:n: is     +  , as in Proposition 2. However, recall
that in Proposition 1 and 2, where  > , the upper-bound price for [S] and the lower-bound
price [S=N ]m:n: are the same. Here with  < , when solving for the condition that a network
must have the size smaller than 1, the resulting inequality gives a smaller lower-bound price
for the market structures [S=N ]c:m: and [S=N ]m:n: than the upper-bound price for the market
structure [S]. Therefore, there is a price range where these two market structures overlap,
namely, when     +    2= < p <     +     . This is also the price range where
the critical-mass network exists. A crucial point here is that the rm's prot levels are not
continuous when switching form [S] to [S=N ] at the price  +    2=. The rm can still
fully serve the market alone if it charges a price no higher than     +    2=, provided
that it is positive.
Note that it must hold that     +    2= > 0, otherwise all three market structures
[S], [S=N ]c:m: and [S=N ]m:n: start at the price of 0, and the section in the graph where [S]
is the unique market structure will not exist. Moreover, for the section in the graph where
[S=N ]m:n: is the unique the market structure in the price range [    +    ;     +  ],
it must hold that     +  >     +     , which means  < 2 . Otherwise, all three
market structures [S], [S=N ]c:m: and [S=N ]m:n: will end at the price of p =     +  , where
the market structure [N ] starts.
4 Firm's decision
The rm sets a prot maximizing price p in stage one, taking into account the possible realized
equilibrium market structure in stage two. Depending on the dierent scenarios in stage two
we discussed in the previous section, the optimum price p can vary in stage one.
In this section, we investigate subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and market outcomes
for each of the scenarios analyzed in the previous section. In the next section, we will then
summarize and regroup the ndings with respect to the equilibrium market structures in
order to provide more economic insights and intuitions.
In the low heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ), the possible equilibrium market structures
in stage two involve multiple equilibria. To deal with the multiplicity of subgame-perfect
equilibria, we follow the convention by supposing that, once the price is known, consumers
coordinate on the equilibrium continuation that they prefer, which is the one with the largest
network size.6
Similar to Herings et al. (2008), we adopt the approach where the second-stage equilibrium
market structure that corresponds to the rm-worst response of the consumers, given the
rst-stage price p, is captured by a lower envelop. This is depicted in Figure 5 below. The
lower envelop is the collection of the three solid lines. Notice that within the price range
[    +    2 ;     +     ], where multiple second-stage equilibria occur, only the one
6See, for instance, Katz and Shapiro (1986) or Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
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with the lowest prot for the rm, i.e. [S=N ]m:n:, is on the lower envelop. Here, we do not
try to produce a full characterization of all subgame-perfect equilibria.7 We will concentrate
instead on the equilibrium continuation that consumers prefer the most, i.e. the one with the
largest network, and assume that they coordinate on this equilibrium continuation after the
price is known. This in fact coincides with the rm-worst situation represented by the lower
envelop.
[S]
[S=N ]c:m:
[S=N ]m:n:
[N ]
-
0 p

    +    2=

    +    

    + 

Figure 5: The lower envelop of the low heterogeneity scenario.
For the convenience in notation, we dene   42   3(    + ). Roughly speaking,
 represents the attractiveness of the network relative to the rm. Indeed,  is increasing in
    and decreasing in .
Furthermore, we use [] to denote the maximum prot of any market structure [] as
depicted in Table 1.
Proposition 4. In the high heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ), there are parameter
settings such that the following four market outcomes and their associated price and prot
levels can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1. The rm serves the entire market by charging a price p =     +     , and makes a
prot level of [S] =     +     .
2. The rm competes directly with the network by charging a price p = 29 (2 
p
)(+
p
)
and earns a prot of [S=N ] =
2
272
(2  p)2( +p).
3. The rm serves precisely up to the last consumer who does not download from the
network by charging a price p =    2 (  
p
2   4(   )), and earns a prot of
[S=N ] boundary = (  
p
4   4 + 2)(2   2 + 
p
4   4 + 2)=42.
4. The rm acts as a local monopoly and charges the price p = 2 and earns a prot of
[S=;=N ] =
2
4 .
Proof.
It is helpful to look back at Figure 2. First of all, any price p >  can not be prot-maximizing,
7For a vigorous derivation of such a full characterization, see Herings et al. (2008).
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since under the market structure of [;=N ] the rm's sales quantity and prot are invariably 0,
and the rm can always do better by charging a price that yields a positive sales quantity. We
therefore conclude that this market structure can not be supported by any subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
Secondly, any price p <  +  can not be prot-maximizing, since the resulting sales
quantity is always 1 (the entire market), and the prot function is continuous and monotonic
in price. This makes p =  +  strictly more protable than any lower price. Therefore,
the highest prot under the market structure [S] corresponds to this price p =    +    .
Moreover, the prot levels are continuous at this price where the market structure switches
from [S] to [S=N ]. The rst derivative of the prot function with respect to price under
the market structure [S=N ] is not strictly positive under the condition      3(   ),
which implies that the prot at this price can be a global maximum prot and hence may
be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium. However, when     < 3(   ), the prot
levels at this price is both continuous and monotonic, in which case the prot at this price
can not be a global maximum.
The prot levels under the market structure of [S=N ], can be non-monotonic with a local
maximum value of [S=N ] =
2
272
(2  p)2( +p), at the price of p[S=N ] = 29 (2  
p
)( +p
), under the condition that   0. This prot level can be a global maximum, hence may
be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
However, if  < 0, the maximum prot of [S=N ] is achieved at the upper boundary
price p =    2 (  
p
2   4(   )), yielding a prot level of [S=N ] boundary = (  p
4   4 + 2)(2 2+
p
4   4 + 2)=42. This can be supported by a subgame-
perfect equilibrium only if the prot under the market structure [S=;=N ] at this price is
decreasing and the prot function is strictly monotonic across its price range until its upper-
bound price p = .
Finally, the prot levels under the market structure of [S=;=N ], also can be non-monotonic.
Under this market structure, the rm is acting as a monopoly and does not compete directly
with the network. The consumer x who is indierent from buying the physical product in the
store and not buying has utility level    x   p = 0, which implies x = (   p)= . Taking
this as a demand function and the rm optimizes its price at p[S=;=N ] = =2, resulting a prot
level of [S=;=N ] = 
2=4 . For this interior solution to be the maximum prot in this price
range, two conditions have to be met. The rst one is that x < 1, which implies that  < 2
must hold. The second one requires that the price p[S=;=N ] = =2 to be in the price range of
[S=;=N ], in particular,  < 2   p2   4(   ). This maximum prot can be a global
maximum, hence may be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In order to demonstrate the existence of parameter settings that qualify the above four
numbered items to be subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, we provide for each of them a
set of example parameters in Table 2. Each of the four columns of the table presents a set
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of parameter values that yield the corresponding prot level as the global maximum, in the
order of the four bullets points described in Proposition 4.
Equilibrium outcomes
Parameters [S] 

[S=N ] [S=N ]   boundary [S=;=N ]
 19 12 12 10
 9 8 8 9
 8 7 7 8
 10 10 12 14
Table 2: Examples of parameter values for Proposition 4 (high heterogeneity scenario)
The relevant prot functions given these four sets of parameter values are as depicted in
Figure 6. The four pictures represent the four sets of parameter values depicted in Table 2
respectively. In each picture, the rm's prot level is depicted as a function of its price.
Dierent line styles represent dierent market structures, which are labeled by the prot
legends ([S], [S=N ], ...). The global maximum prots in these four pictures are achieved
under the market structures indicated by the market legends at the bottom of each picture
([S], [S=N ], ...), as described in Proposition 4.
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p p
 
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[S=N ]
[S=N ]
[S=;=N ]
[S=;=N ]
2 4 6 8 10 12
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0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
4 : [S=;=N ]3 : [S=N ]{boundary
p p
 
[S=N ] [S=N ][S=;=N ] [S=;=N ]
Figure 6: Prot functions and equilibrium outcomes (high heterogeneity scenario)
We only plot the prot levels in the relevant price range, namely, p 2 [0; ]. Notice the
continuity of prot levels in all four pictures while rising and falling with prices across dierent
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market structures.
Proposition 5. In the medium heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ), there are parameter
settings such that the following two market outcomes and their associated price and prot
levels can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1. The rm serves the entire market by charging a price p =     +     , and makes a
prot level of [S] =     +     .
2. The rm competes directly with the network by charging a price p = 29 (2 
p
)(+
p
)
and earns a prot of [S=N ] =
2
272
(2  p)2( +p).
Proof.
In this scenario, as Figure 3 shows, there are three possible equilibrium market structures in
stage two given rm's price p from stage one.
Similar to Proposition 4, the maximum prot under the market structure [S] is achieved
at the boundary price p =     +     . Under the condition that      3(   ), the
rst derivative of the prot function [S=N ] at this price is non positive, which implies that
this prot level can be a global maximum, hence may be supported by a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
If   < 3(  ), the prot levels under the market structure [S] are strictly dominated
by at least one prot level under the market structure [S=N ]. In this case, The prot func-
tion [S=N ] reaches a local maximum 

[S=N ] =
2
272
(2  p)2( +p), before subsequently
decreasing until reaching 0 at the upper-bound price p =     +  .
Finally, the market structure [N ] with the rm having zero prot can not be sustained
by any subgame-perfect equilibrium either, since the rm can always do better by charging a
lower price in order to have at least some sales.
Again we demonstrate the existence of parameter settings that qualify the above two
numbered items to be subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes by providing for each of them
a set of example parameters in Table 3. Each of the two columns of Table 3 presents a set
of parameter values that yield the corresponding prot level as the global maximum, in the
order of the two numbered items described in Proposition 5.
Equilibrium outcomes
Parameters [S] 

[S=N ]
 16 13
 11 11
 9 9
 10 10
Table 3: Examples of parameter values for Proposition 5 (medium heterogeneity scenario)
14
The relevant prot functions given these two sets of parameter values are as depicted in
Figure 7. The two pictures represent the two sets of parameter values depicted in Table 3
respectively. Notice once again the continuity in prot levels across market structures.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
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p p
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1 : [S] 2 : [S=N ]
Figure 7: Prot functions and equilibrium outcomes (medium heterogeneity scenario)
Proposition 6. In the low heterogeneity scenario ( >  > ), there are parameter
settings such that the following two market outcomes and their associated price and prot
levels can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1. The rm sets a network-deterring price p =   +    2 and serves the entire market
alone, making a prot of [S] =     +    
2
 .
2. The rm competes directly with the network by charging a price p = 29 (2 
p
)(+
p
)
and earns a prot of [S=N ] =
2
272
(2  p)2( +p).
Proof.
It is helpful to look back at the lower envelop in Figure 5 at the beginning of the section.
First of all, as the previous propositions, the last part of the lower envelop representing the
second stage equilibrium [N ] clearly can not yield any possible subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome, because the rm is making zero prot. However, the other two sections, namely [S]
and [S=N ]m:n:, can.
The highest prot level on the [S] section of the lower envelop is achieved at the right-hand
extreme of the line at the price of p[S] =  +   
2
 , under the condition that it is positive.
Since sales quantity is 1 in a fully-served market, this yields a prot of [S] =   +    
2
 ,
which can be a global maximum prot and hence may be supported by a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
The prot function on the section [S=N ]m:n: is similar to the previous two propositions.
However, observe the discontinuity of the prot levels from the market structure [S] to
[S=N ]m:n: at the price level p =     +    2 . In fact, the prot level at this price un-
der the market structure [S=N ]m:n: is exactly a fraction

 of the prot under the market
structure of [S]. In other words, a small increase in price triggers a network of the size 1  
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to form and signicantly hurts the sales quantity of the rm. The prot function [S=N ]m:n:
does increase in price though, until reaching its maximum [S=N ]m:n: =
2
272
(2 p)2(+p)
at the price [S=N ] =
2
272
(2   p)2( + p), before decreasing again all the way to zero,
under the condition   0. This can be a global maximum prot and hence may be supported
by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Note that the maximum prot under the market structure [S=N ] is achieved at its lower-
bound price if  < 0, which implies     +    423 > 0. This fullls the condition that
    +    2 > 0. In that case the rm will indeed charge a price at p[S] =     +    
2

to deter the network.
As with the previous propositions, we demonstrate the existence of parameter settings
that qualify the above two numbered items to be subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes by
providing for each of them a set of example parameters in Table 4.
Equilibrium outcomes
Parameters [S] 

[S=N ]
 14 12
 13 11
 12 9:5
 10 9
Table 4: Examples of parameter values for Proposition 6 (low heterogeneity scenario)
The relevant prot functions given these two sets of parameter values are as depicted in
Figure 8. The two pictures represent the two sets of parameter values depicted in Table 4
respectively. Notice this time the discontinuity in prot levels across market structures.
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p p
 
1 : [S] 2 : [S=N ]
Figure 8: Prot functions and equilibrium outcomes (low heterogeneity scenario)
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5 Equilibrium market structures
We summarize the analysis of the scenarios above by means of the following four corollaries,
in which we show the optimal prices of the rm and the resulting market structures that are
supported by a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1. Partially-served local monopoly.
When  is suciently large ( >  > ), the rm can act as a monopoly while ignoring the
P2P network by charging a price p = 2 and making a prot of 

[S=;=N ] =
2
4 . The outcome
is a multi-platformed partially-served market { [S=;=N ].
This result is stemming from the high heterogeneity scenario. When the taste hetero-
geneity  is high enough, the consumers are suciently dierentiated so that in equilibrium
the rm can safely disregard the network at the other end of the market (those who prefer
the digital form will therefore download) and charge its monopolistic price to its \own" con-
sumers. The two platforms will, therefore, co-exist and not compete; and the market will be
partially served.
Corollary 1, in combination with Herings et al. (2008), shows that  >  is a necessary
condition for a multi-platformed partially-served market. One could interpret  >  as the
situation that tastes dier so much across consumers that some consumers would not have
the illegal version even if downloading it costs zero time and eort.
Corollary 2. Fully-served monopoly.
When  is not too small, the rm can serve the entire market at the prot-maximizing price
level p =     +     and a prot level of [S] =     +     , and the outcome is a
single-platformed fully-served market { [S].
This result is stemming from the high and medium heterogeneity cases. The rm's natural
prot maximizing sales quantity is the entire market. This is chiey due to the fact that
the basic utility of the physical product is so high that the taste heterogeneity cost becomes
insignicant in comparison. Although this is theoretically possible, in reality the taste het-
erogeneity is probably high enough that in equilibrium not everyone will be naturally served
by the monopoly. Therefore, we will not dig too much deeper in the analysis of this market
outcome.
Corollary 3. Network deterrence.
When  is very small ( >  > ), the rm can serve the entire market and thereby deter
the entry of the network by charging a price of p =     +    2 , making a prot of
[S] =     +    
2
 , and the outcome is a single-platformed fully-served market { [S].
This result is stemming from the low heterogeneity scenario. Note that opposite to Corol-
lary 1, where  is the biggest, in Corollary 3,  is the smallest. This proposition demonstrates
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that under certain parameter conditions, there is a possibility for the rm to deter the network
from forming by an aggressive pricing strategy. Observe that this is only possible when the
taste heterogeneity is very small. Since consumers never fail to coordinate on forming a net-
work (owing to Assumption 2), the only way for the rm to deter the network is to serve the
whole market itself, even if, by doing so, it can no longer charge a monopoly price. Indeed,
under these conditions, if the rm ignores the network and charges the normal monopoly
price, the network would form and reach its maximum equilibrium size and cause some seri-
ous damage on the rm's sales. The rm is, therefore, better o deviating from the monopoly
price and setting a network-deterring price.
Corollary 4. Market sharing
When  is very large, the rm serves precisely up to the last consumer who does not download
from the network by charging a price p =    2 (  
p
2   4(   )), and earns a prot of
[S=N ] boundary = (  
p
4   4 + 2)(2   2 + 
p
4   4 + 2)=42. The market
outcome is a fully-served multi-platformed market without the two platforms competing with
each other { [S=N ]  boundary.
This is a rather special market outcome, where the rm and the network together \share"
the whole market without actually competing with each other. It relies on the fact that the
taste heterogeneity is suciently large such that the rm does not have to ght hard with the
network for the indierent consumer; but at the same time not so large such that the rm
enjoys being a local monopoly as in Corollary 1. Note that the rm is actually pricing higher
than its monopolistic price due to the presence of the network. For at the monopolistic price,
the rm would face competition from the network and thereby unable to achieve monopolistic
quantity. Thus, the rm sets the price at exactly the level so as to leave the network alone
and served the entire residual demand of the market.
Corollary 5. Network accommodation.
Regardless of the value of  , there are parameter settings where the rm competes directly
with the P2P network by charging a price p = 29 (2  
p
)( +
p
), making a prot of
[S=N ] =
2
272
(2  p)2( +p), and the market outcome is a multi-platformed fully-served
market { [S=N ].
This corollary captures all the rest of the parameter space which is not covered in Corol-
lary 1, 2, 3 and 4. It is essentially the relation  >  that makes the network readily
available, and that makes network accommodation (co-existence) a prominent phenomenon.
The corollaries summarize the essential ndings of this paper and tells a rather compelling
story. When consumers view the two versions as very dierent ( being large), the rm may
enjoy the luxury of not having to deal with the network since its own clientele is by no means
aected. For this to happen, the basic utility of the illegal version  should be relatively
small and/or the generic cost factor of downloading  should be relatively high. In this case,
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aggressive price competition is not called for. When the taste dierences are less pronounced,
however, price competition with the network cannot be avoided. The rm has to accommodate
the network, and they ght with each other for the marginal consumer. Together they serve
the entire market. The situation changes even further when the taste heterogeneity reaches a
very low level. In that case, consumers no longer have high disutility for consuming the least
preferred version, and the rm may have a chance to price aggressively in order to grab hold
of the whole market and deter the network from forming.
Furthermore,  = 42   3(    + ) plays an important role in determining market
outcomes. Recall that  corresponds to the attractiveness of the network relative to the rm.
For the rm to ignore the existence of the network,  has to be relatively small. This requires,
among other things,  to be relatively small and  to be relatively large. It is consistent with
what is required by Corollary 1. Alternatively, for the rm to be able to deter the entry of
the network,  has to be small as well. But Corollary 3 requires  to be large and  to be
small, which makes  relatively large. This implies that  and  have to be relatively large
for  to be small. Intuitively, if consumers do not care too much about the dierence between
versions, the rm can only deter the network if its product is much more superior in quality
and the generic factor of downloading is relatively large. This may in reality prove hard to
achieve.
6 Comparative statics
The previous section shows how taste heterogeneity  can aect the possible equilibrium
outcome in the market. It is essentially a comparative static analysis across equilibrium
market structures. It may be interesting also to look at comparative statics of all the main
parameters of the model in given equilibrium market structures. In Herings et al. (2008),
the comparative statics of many market structures have been extensively studied, including
the single-platformed as well as the multi-platformed fully-served markets. The main ndings
there are the following. The larger the generic cost factor of downloading is, the less likely
a P2P network will form, and the higher the rm's prot will be. Once the market exhibits
co-existence of the two platforms, the smaller the cost factor is, the higher the price set by
the rm. Despite this pricing behavior, the rm's prot unambiguously declines as the cost
factor decreases. In the partially-served monopolistic market with network-deterring pricing
and the fully-served market with multi-platform co-existence, the total welfare decreases in
the cost factor. For a comprehensive overview of this, we refer to that paper.
Due to the dierent parameter settings in this paper { smaller  and less restrictions on
{ two additional market outcomes can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium. One
is a naturally fully-served monopoly market [S], and the other a multi-platformed partially-
served local monopoly market [S=;=N ]. We focus on the latter more interesting one and look
at its comparative statics. Here the rm is ignoring the network all together. It charges a
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monopoly price p, serving a market the size of s, and making a prot of . The network
lives at the other end of the market with a size of n.8 We will also look at the eects on
consumers' surplus and the total welfare, denoted by CS and W , respectively.
Proposition 7. The signs of the rst order partial derivatives of the equilibrium values with
respect to the parameters in the case of the monopoly market are as shown in Table 5.
   
p + 0 0 0
s + 0   0
n 0 +    
 + 0   0
CS + +    
W  + +    
Table 5: Multi-platformed partially-served (local monopoly) market.
Proof.
The comparative statics of all parameters on p = 2 , s
 = 2 , and 
 = 
2
4 are straight
forward. The equilibrium network size n = 1   12 (  
p
2   4(   )) does not depend
on , and it is easy to see that it increases in . The rst derivative of n with respect to 
and  can be shown to be both negative.
The consumers' surplus can be divided into two components: the surplus for the buyers
and the surplus for the downloaders, which we denote by CSS and CS

N , respectively. The
expression for the former CSS =
2
8 . It is clear that the signs of its derivatives with respective
to , ,  and  are +, 0,   and 0. The expression of CSN is slightly more involved,
but we know that it is the integral of the utility functions of the downloaders, which is
  (1 x) (1 n)2, with respect to x. It is clear that  and  both have negative eects
on each downloader's utility. Moreover, we know that they also have negative eects on the
network size n. This shows that the total eects of  and  must be negative on downloaders'
surplus CSN . Combined with the eects on the buyers' surplus CS

S , it can be seen that the
eects of , ,  and  on consumers' surplus CS are +, +,   and  , respectively. The
eects on the total welfare are then simply the sum of the eects on consumers' surplus CS
and the rm's prot , which are unambiguous.
The intuition of the negative eect of the generic cost factor of downloading  on the equi-
librium network size n is self-evident: a higher cost factor makes the network less attractive
and therefore resulting in a smaller equilibrium network. The cost factor does not have an
eect on the surplus of buyers of the physical product, but does have a negative aect on that
of the downloaders. This is reected both by the direct multiplicative eect of downloading
8See Appendices for the derivations.
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cost and the indirect negative eect of  on the equilibrium network size n. Since  does
not aect the rm's prot, it does not inict further harm to the society other than crippling
the downloaders.
The negative welfare eects of the taste heterogeneity  is rather logical. Firstly,  has
a negative eect on the rm's prot , because for given basic utility , a high  leads to
a lower sales quantity while the price remains constant. Thus, despite the fact that the rm
has a monopoly position caused by taste heterogeneity, its prot suers when it increases.
Next, the consumers' surplus of the buyers of the physical product is negatively aected by
 , not because of the price, but because of disutility of transportation cost for each consumer
and the smaller equilibrium sales quantity s. The surplus from the downloaders is even
more negatively aected by  , not only because  represents transportation cost deducted
from the utility, but also because  decreases the equilibrium network size n which is in turn
reected in a higher downloading cost (a negative utility). Taste heterogeneity in this case is
undoubtedly bad for the society as a whole.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper adopts the model from Herings et al. (2008) and changes the parameter settings
to accommodate the inherent strength of today's peer-to-peer le-sahring networks. In par-
ticular, we consider that there are always some \die-hard" P2P fans who contribute to the
network's existence, and we allow the cases for relatively high level of consumer taste hetero-
geneity. As a result, the ght against a P2P network becomes much tougher as the consumers
rarely fail to coordinate on forming a network. We nd in total ve equilibrium market struc-
tures, although under most conditions, the network will prevail and the rm can do nothing
else than accommodating it and pricing against it to serve the entire market together. In this
case, the rm's prot suers and the total welfare benets from the existence of P2P.
There may be some special conditions under which the rm still might have the upper
hand. The rm can, for instance, nd itself in the position to want to optimally serve the
whole market, if the value of its product is signicantly higher than that of the pirated
version, and the taste heterogeneity is low. Another example is when the subjective taste
heterogeneity becomes very small, coupled with a relatively high value of the physical form
comparing to the digital form, the rm might be able to charge a low enough price to deter
the network from forming. One practical example could be the newspaper market. The
value of a particular newspaper might drop drastically when it is one-day old. Therefore the
value of an original newspaper may be considerably higher than a copied version. Thus if the
newspaper is priced competitively enough, it might completely prevent anyone from having
any incentives to share it on the P2P networks.
Another rather special market structure is market-sharing, which happens when the taste
heterogeneity is just so that the rm chooses to precisely serve the consumers who prefer
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not to download. In this situation the rm is actually pricing higher than its monopolistic
price due to the presence of the network. For at the monopolistic price, the rm would face
competition from the network and thereby unable to achieve the monopolistic quantity. Thus,
the rm sets the price at exactly the level such that the consumer who is indierent between
downloading and not consuming will actually buy the physical form of the product from the
rm. In other words, the rm lets the network form to its maximum size and serves the
residual demand of the market.
The other end of spectrum is when the taste heterogeneity is huge. In this case, the
products are suciently dierentiated and the rm and the network are co-existing as lo-
cal monopolies without competition. Under this multi-platformed partially-served market
structure, the quality of the two versions of the product positively aect the price, the sales
quantity and the prot of the rm, as well as the consumers' surplus and hence welfare as a
whole. Taste heterogeneity unambiguously hurts the sales, the prots and consumers' surplus
and hence total welfare, although it has no eect on the price. It is clear that it is the large
taste heterogeneity that gives rise to this monopolistic market structure in the rst place,
so it is not surprising that it hurts welfare, although it is interesting to observe that it also
hurts the rm's prot. The generic cost factor of downloading  decreases the total welfare
because it hurts the downloading consumers but does not benet the purchasing consumers
or the rm's prot.
Finally, it is useful to stress that except for these special conditions mentioned above, the
rm has no other option but to face the network and compete head-on with it in price. The
resulting equilibrium market structure is the multi-platformed fully-served market where the
rm and the network co-exist and compete for the marginal consumer. This is much studied
in Herings et al. (2008), and most important results in that paper still hold here, except for
the fact that the parameter space for this equilibrium market structure may be more pervasive
in this paper.
The pervasiveness of the co-existence market structure in this paper may explain why,
despite all the eort from the authorities and the publishing rms in the chasing and hunting
of P2P users, the results have not been hugely impressive, and internet piracy is still by
and large an eminent phenomenon. Perhaps it is precisely those few, who believe in and
stand by the principle of sharing and continue to provide the vital \critical mass" to the rest,
that contribute to the prevalence of such le-sharing communities. And given the technology
and the dispersion of the user base of such networks, it is less and less likely for anyone to
technically eliminate such le sharing. It looks like the information good providers of the 21st
century really have their work cut out for them.
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8 Discussion
It might be helpful to combine the ndings of this paper and those of Herings et al. (2008) into
the same context, in order to have a complete picture of the matter at hand. The key issues
here obviously are the legal anti-piracy enforcement (captured by the generic cost factor of
downloading) and the dierence in taste in the society with regard to legal and illegal copies
(captured by taste heterogeneity), and the way the society is inuenced by these factors, both
the consumers and the rm.
When the legal enforcement level is high (high cost factor of downloading), networks may
fail to form and the rm in a lot of cases may have the possibility to deter the network using
aggressive pricing or to ignore the network all together. In those cases, the rm has little
worries. However, when the enforcement level is low, as we have seen in this paper, the rm
is in much worse shape. Most of the network-deterring conditions will not be met and the
rm has to accommodate the network and compete in price and sacrice both on price and
sales quantity, and thereby prot.
Only when the taste heterogeneity is low, the rm may have a chance to deter the network
but only if it is ready to cover the entire market with aggressive pricing. This will only work
if the level of legal enforcement is reasonably high. Needless to say, the rm should ensure
the superior quality of the physical product, like in our newspaper market example.
At the other end of the scale, where the taste heterogeneity is so huge that the two
plat-forms co-exist without competing for consumers leaving a section of market unserved is
probably easier to conceive since most real-life markets are partially served.
Finally, it might be worth stressing that the total welfare in all of the possible market
outcomes we have found in the model unambiguously benets from low legal enforcement and
low taste heterogeneity. The reason for the former is that low enforcement fosters a strong
potential network, which either directly provides consumers' surplus by means of downloads
or indirectly cuts deadweight loss by putting pressure on the price and thereby increasing
sales quantity. The reason for the latter is simply the fact that taste heterogeneity can be
considered as a sort of transportation cost that is subtracted from the consumers' surplus and
going into no one else's surplus.
To sum up all the analysis that have been done around this model, it is the probably
realistic to consider in most of the markets for information goods today the rms are accom-
modating networks. Furthermore, the analysis has given us some insights on how the market
outcomes can be dierent when some of the factors we observe today were to change. It also
gives suggestions to the impact on the rm's prots and the total welfare, as a result of these
possible changes.
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A Solutions of the multi-platformed market structures
A.1 Fully-served market
The consumer z 2 (0; 1) that separates the consumers choosing for the rm from those choos-
ing for the network, is herself indierent between the two options. Moreover this consumer
should weakly prefer the rm to the option not to acquire the product. So, for a second-stage
equilibrium to generate the structure [S=N ], it should hold that, given the choices of everyone
else,
0  U z(p; S) = U z(p;N) () 0     z   p =    (1  z)  (1  n(p))2;
where n(p) = 1  z, since the market is fully-served. Solving the inequality for z gives us two
solutions:
zc:m:(p) =
+
p
(p+  )+2
 and zm:n:(p) =
 
p
(p+  )+2
 ;
where we call the solution corresponding to the smaller network size (zc:m:) the critical-mass
network, and the solution corresponding to the larger network size (zm:n:) the maximum
network. The solutions will only be real if (p+       ) + 2  0, which puts a condition
on prices and will be discussed later in more detail. Moreover, z 2 (0; 1) will be a necessary
condition for the relevant parameters settings.
A.2 Partially-served market
The consumer zS 2 (0; 1) (zN 2 (0; 1)) that separates the consumers choosing for the rm
(network) from those choosing not to acquire any product, is herself indierent between the
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two options. Moreover, this consumer prefers both the rm (network) and no acquisition to
the option to acquire via the network (rm). We have a partially-served market if there is an
interval of consumers that prefers no acquisition to acquisition, meaning that zS is less than
zN . So, for a second-stage equilibrium to generate the structure [S=;=N ], it should hold that,
given the choices of everyone else,
U z
S
(p; S) = U z
S
(p; ;) and U zN (p;N) = UzN (p; ;)
and
0  zS(p) < zN (p)  1:
The rst two equations are equivalent to
   zS   p = 0 and    (1  zN )  (1  n(p))2 = 0:
where n(p) = 1   zN . Solving the rst equation for zS and the latter for zN gives us one
solution for zS :
zS(p) =  p ;
and two solutions for zN :
zNc:m: =
+
p
2+4( )
2 and z
N
m:n: =
 
p
2+4( )
2 :
Again, these solutions will only be real if 2 + 4(   )  0, which puts a condition on the
relevant parameter settings and will be explained later in more detail.
B Supports of Proposition 1{3
B.1 Proposition 1
The following shows the feasible market structures for the high heterogeneity scenario ( >
 > ) and the price range for each market structure.
[S] requires that all consumers prefer the physical version to the digital version, including
the consumer located at x = 1 whose choice constitutes the binding condition,
      p      () p      +    
Hence, this is the maximum price with which the rm can grab hold of the whole market. A
price any higher than this, the market will turn into [S=N ], which we will investigate little
later on. Note that for this to be an equilibrium market structure,     +      0 is a
necessary condition.
A necessary condition for the market structure [N ] to exist is that the consumer located
at x = 0 must have positive utility from downloading when everyone else is downloading.
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This requires    (1  0)  (1  1)2 > 0()  >  , which is in conict with the parameter
setting in this scenario. We conclude, therefore, that in the high heterogeneity scenario [N ]
does not exist.
[;=N ] though does exist in principle, and the condition for that is that the rm charges a
price so high, i.e. when p > , that no one buys the physical product from the rm. But this
is not that interesting since in equilibrium p >  will never be the case.
Next, under the market structure of [S=N ], there is a consumer located at x = z who
is indierent from buying and downloading. The conditions that have to be fullled are the
utilities of these choices are equal, positive, and the location of z is within (0; 1). Formally,
   z   p =    (1  z)  z2 (1)
0 < z < 1 (2)
   z   p  0 (3)
As explained in Appendix A, solving equation (1) yields two solutions for z:
zc:m:(p) =
+
p
(p+  )+2
 and zm:n:(p) =
 
p
(p+  )+2
 ;
In order to guarantee the solution to be real, we need
p      +    2 : (4)
It can be easily seen that zc:m: > 1, as
p
(p+       ) + 2  0 and  > , and hence the
critical mass equilibrium does not exist in this scenario.
Let us now look at the unique solution, the maximum network. Inequality (2) essentially
has two components. The rst component 0 < z can be expressed as
 
p
(p+  )+2
 > 0()   
p
(p+       ) + 2 > 0
() (p+       ) < 0() p <     + 
The second component z < 1 can be expressed as
 
p
(p+  )+2
 < 1()
p
(p+       ) + 2 >    
() p+        >  2 +  () p >     +    
Note that this coincides exactly the upper-bound price level of the market structure [S]. In
other words, this is the price level where [S] stops and [S=N ] starts. Finally, inequality (3)
requires
      
p
(p+  )+2
   p  0()
p
(p+       ) + 2      p  :
To further simplify this inequality, we need to examine two cases. The rst case is when
    p   < 0, which implies that inequality (3) would be trivially satised. It also means
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that p <    2 . But for this to hold together with inequality (4), it must be that  >  ,
which is in conict with the parameter settings of this scenario. It leaves us the second case
where p     2 , which implies,
(p+       ) + 2  2 + 2
2
(   p)2   2(   p):
Solving this inequality for p yields,
   2 ( +
p
2   4(   ))  p     2 (  
p
2   4(   )): (5)
The condition on the left-hand side of inequality (5) is redundant because    2 ( +p
2   4(   ))      +     . The condition on the right-hand side of inequality
(5) is the upper bound of the price in [S=N ], as it is smaller than     +  .9 Naturally for
this price to be real, the condition 2   4(   )  0 must hold.
Finally, when the market structure [S=;=N ] prevails, there will be two indierent con-
sumers: the one who is indierent between buying the physical product from the rm and
not consuming at all, and the other who is indierent from downloading from P2P and not
consuming at all. Let the former be located at x = zS , then it must be that his utility of
buying the physical product is equal to not consuming which is equal to 0.
   zS   p = 0:
Solving it for zS yields zS =  p . Let the consumer who is indierent from downloading and
not consuming be located at x = zN , then we have
   (1  zN )  (zN )2 = 0:
Solving it for zN , we obtain two solutions: zNm:n: =
1
2 (  
p
2   4(   )) and zNc:m: =
1
2 ( +
p
2   4(   )), where, as before, zNm:n: refers to the maximum network, and zNc:m:
the critical mass network. Again it is easy to see that zNc:m: > 1, i.e. the critical mass network
solution does not exist.10 The unique solution is then zNm:n:, which is only positive if  >  > .
This corresponds precisely to the parameter settings of this scenario. Furthermore, for the
market structure [S=;=N ] to exist, the following condition has to be fullled.
0 < zS < zNm:n: < 1 (6)
The left part of the inequality, zS > 0, is simply  p > 0 () p < . The right part of the
inequality, zNm:n: < 1, always holds.
11 Now the middle part of inequality (6) is the only thing
that puts a restriction on the price range of [S=;=N ]. It requires  
p
2+4( )
2 >
 p
 ()p
2 + 4(   ) <    ( p)2 () p >    2 (  
p
2   4(   )).
9It is easy to verify that    
2
(  p2   4(   )) <  <     +  .
10It requires
+
p
2 4( )
2
> 1 () p2   4(   ) > 2    . If 2 <  , this is trivially true; and if
2   , then it requires that 2   4(   ) > 2   4 + 42 ()  > , which is true.
11It requires
 
p
2 4( )
2
< 1 () p2   4(   ) >    2. If  < 2, this is trivially true; and if
  2, then it requires that 2   4(   ) > 2   4 + 42 ()  > , which is true.
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B.2 Proposition 2
The following shows the feasible market structures for the medium heterogeneity scenario
( >  > ) and the price range for each market structure.
The market structure [S] is still possible, and as conditions are the same as in the high
heterogeneity scenario, so is the price range p      +     . Any price higher than that,
we will be in the market structure of [S=N ].
For the market of structure [S=N ], we will again have a unique solution, namely, the
maximum network equilibrium zm:n: =
 
p
(p+  )+2
 . This is because zc:m: > 1, hence
the critical mass network equilibrium does not exist. Thus, for [S=N ] to exist, the following
conditions have to be fullled.
0 < zm:n: < 1 (7)
     zm:n:   p  0 (8)
The left-hand side of inequality (7) requires
 
p
(p+  )+2
 > 0()
p
(p+       ) + 2 < 
() (p+       ) < 0() p <     + :
The right-hand side of inequality (7) requires
 
p
(p+  )+2
 < 1()
p
(p+       ) + 2 >     () p >        + 
We will now show that inequality (8) does not further restrict the price. Inequality (8) is
equivalent to
p
(p+       ) + 2      (   p). In case the right-hand side of this
inequality is negative, i.e. in case p <    2 , the inequality is trivially satised. Otherwise,
p    2 , then inequality (8) implies 2 (  p)2  (  p)  (  )  0, which is equivalent
to    2 ( +
p
2 + 4(   ))  p     2 (  
p
2 + 4(   )). Because  >  , the
lower bound on p is less than    2 and therefore satised since we are considering the case
p     2 . The upper bound is larger than . Hence inequality (8) does not further restrict
the price in either direction.
Now we show that the multi-platformed, partially-served market [S=;=N ] can not ex-
ist in the medium heterogeneity scenario. Consider the consumer who is indierent from
downloading and not consuming. Similar to the previous scenario, we solve for the condi-
tion of indierence and obtain two solutions: zNm:n: =
1
2 (  
p
2 + 4(   )) and zNc:m: =
1
2 ( +
p
2 + 4(   )). It is easy to see that, given  >  , zNm:n: < 0 and zNc:m: > 1. This
means that neither of these two solution exists.
Finally, opposite to the case in the high heterogeneity scenario, the market structure [;=N ]
can not exist but [N ] can, because  >  . The condition for this market structure to prevail
is that the consumer located at x = 0 prefers downloading from P2P to buying from the rm.
This implies     >    p() p >     +  .
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B.3 Proposition 3
The following shows the feasible market structures for the low heterogeneity scenario ( >
 > ) and the price range for each market structure.
The market structure [S] is once again similar as two previous scenarios, and the price
range is p      +    . At a higher price, the market structure will be [S=N ]. Unlike the
previous two scenarios, the market structure [S=N ] in this scenario is slightly more involved.
In particular, both the critical mass network and the maximum network solutions exist, which
causes multiple equilibria in the second stage.
We rst look at the maximum network solution zm:n:. The requirements for existence are
as usual:
0  zm:n: < 1 (9)
     zm:n:   p  0 (10)
The left-hand side of inequality (9) requires, as in the medium heterogeneity scenario, p 
    +  . This is the upper-bound price for the market structure [S=N ]m:n:. The right-hand
side, however, leads to a dierent condition due to the fact that  < .
 
p
(p+  )+2
 < 1()
p
(p+       ) + 2 >    :
Since  >  in this scenario, the condition is satised whenever the square root exists, which
is when p >     +    2 . Similar to the medium heterogeneity scenario, inequality (10)
does not further restrict the prices.
The lower-bound price of [S=N ]m:n: is therefore    +    2 , which is below the upper-
bound price of [S],     +    . This can be shown by supposing if the opposite were true,
namely  +   2 >  +  . After rearranging, we get 2   
2
   > 0. Multiplying
both sides by  and rearranging yields (   )2 < 0, which is clearly impossible. Therefore
the price in the market structure [S=N ]m:n: satises     +    2 < p <     +  .
Furthermore, we need to investigate the critical mass solution zc:m: in this scenario. The
requirements for existence are similar to those of zm:n:, namely,
0  zc:m: < 1 (11)
     zc:m:   p  0 (12)
The left-hand side of inequality (11) is trivially satised. The right-hand side can be simplied
to p <     +     . Inequality (12) is equivalent top
(p+       ) + 2   (   p)  :
This condition holds only if the right-hand side of this inequality is non-negative, that is
p     2 , and

2
(   p)2   (   p)  (   )  0;
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where the latter inequality is equivalent to
p     2 ( +
p
2 + 4(   )) or p     2 (  
p
2 + (   )):
Since  >  , the right-hand side of the second inequality exceeds  and hence cannot be
satised|leaving the rst inequality to be satised. Moreover, the right-hand side of the rst
inequality is less than    2 , hence inequality (12) is satised if and only if
p     2 ( +
p
2 + 4(   )):
Now we need to see if this poses a further restriction on the upper-bound price. Since
 >  , we know that
p
2 + 4(   ) >  . Because  < , it is then easy to see that
   2 ( +
p
2 + 4(   )) >     . But because  > , we also know that     +
    <     . This implies that inequality (12) does not pose further restrictions on the
upper-bound price. Therefore, the price boundaries for the market structure [S=N ]c:m: are
    +    2 < p <        + .
Finally, the market structure [N ] is the same as in the medium heterogeneity scenario,
namely, p >     +  .
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